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Abstract 
covert visual attention has been st udied at several 
levels of observation and from several perspectives. 
Literature on covert attention, visual system information 
processing, and controlled and automatic information 
processing is reviewed and related to issues of attention, 
distraction and distractibility. A psychophysical 
experiment is described, in which speeded button press 
response was required to identify one of two target letters 
in a briefly presented four letter array. Cuing blinks 
appeared on the right or left side immediately prior to the 
array; depending on the exper i mental co ndi tion, subjects 
were informed that the blink (a) indicate d the side on 
which the target letter would appear, (b) indicated the 
opposite side, or (c) was random and uninformative of 
target position. Results of analysis of variance and 
Attention Operating Characteristic (AOC) analysis are 
presented on the performance of 22 university undergraduate 
subjects. Cuing blinks appeared to "pull" attention 
automatically even when known to be uninformative; 
moreover, the voluntary use of blinks (dur in g informative 
cue conditions) resulted in slower reaction times, 
consistent with a controlled processing account. The 
iii 
covert attention effect is discussed with respect to 
distraction and individual differenc es , and comments are 
made on Shaw's (1980) argument that much of what has been 
regarded as attentional sensitivity may actually be the 
results of strategies and judgement criteria. 
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The study of attention ca n be seen as a sort of core 
sample of the past hundred years of psychology, in which 
the strata are particularly clear. In the earliest 
stratum (the Subjective Era) are the origins of 
attentional study. The subjective experience of 
selective attention was the starting point, and figured 
prominently in discussions of awareness and thinking. 
Due to a change in climate unfavorable to 11mentalistic" 
concepts, the subsequent stratum (the Behaviorist Era) is 
very thin, with discrimination training bei n g a typical 
rubric under which issues of selectivity were addressed. 
Attention as a distinct area of study was virtually 
extinct (Dember & Warm, 1979). The next stratum (the 
Information Processing Era ) has left a thick sediment, 
characterized by the use of performance (especially of 
concurrent tasks ) as a research paradigm, a n d by 
controversy about how early or late in the seguence of 
cognitive process e s attentional selectivity operates. 
The present period is noteworthy for the attempts to 
reintroduce conscious experience as a construct, and to 
integrate attentional theory with memory-oriented 
information processing theory, with performance data, and 
with knoviedge about nervous system functioning (e.g., 
Posner, 198 2) • 
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The pr es ent stu dy fol1ows this trend toward 
integration, and concerns an att e ntional effect var iously 
termed "covert attention," "the spatial attention 
system," "the fu nctional fovea," or "the mind's eye." 
Just as overt shifting of visu a l attention (i.e., eye and 
body movements) functions to bring objects of interest 
onto the central (foveal) region of the retina and to 
maintain them there, shifts of covert attent io n appear to 
involve the movement of a region of increased sens i tivity 
within visual space while the reti nal image remains 
static. Previous studies have used covert atte n tion 
effects i nfer r e d from performance data -- in 
connection with visual information proc e ssin g and 
neurophysiology (Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976), neuroanatomy 
and subjective experience (Posner, 1982), and automatic 
and voluntary/attended information processing (Bashinski 
& Bacharach, 1980; Jonides, 1980; Jonides, Note 2; 
Hoffman & Nelson, Note 1; Carr & Bacharach, 1976). 
The range of these studies leaves the author with 
t wo impressions. First, it ap pears that we are 
approaching the ability to mak e confident and meaningful 
identif i cations of neural functi o ning with cognitive 
functionin g in the case of covert attention. Second, 
several of psychology's classic controversies are at 
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issue here, most notably aspects of the mind body 
problem. Covert attention seems t o be a point at which 
"biology" intrudes upward into "cognition," and 
"cognition" penetrates down into "biology." 
The current study asks two general questions about 
covert attention: How does it coordinate with higher, 
voluntary cognitive processes? And can the nature of 
this coordination shed light on the subjective experience 
of distraction and the presumed trait of distractibility? 
Answers to these questions would help to specify the 
degree of "downward" influence (e.g., can covert 
attention shifting be attenuated or disabled?) and the 
consequences of 11upward 11 influence (e.g., does covert 
attention control cooperate or compete with voluntary 
control?). in addition, a theoretical basis and 
operational definition for distractibility might be 
begun, and the issue of individual differences would be 
raised. 
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covert Attention 
A clear and dramatic demonstration of covert 
attention was done by Kaufman and Richards (1969). Using 
a technigue called Haidinger•s Brush, which produces with 
polarized light the illusion of a rotating propeller at 
the foveal center of vision, they found that subjects• 
reports of where they were looking deviated by as much as 
2 degrees from t he position of the "propeller." Their 
task involved extended viewing of geometric figures, and 
such variables as the acuteness of open angles were found 
to affect mean fixation positions (Kaufman & Richards, 
1969). 
Subsequent attempts to demonstrate covert attention 
effects (reviewed by Jonides, Note 2; Bashinski & 
Bacharach, 1980) had uneven success. Jonides (Note 2J 
observes that most of the successful attempts used visual 
marker cues at or near the location of the target which 
followed, while unsuccessful attempts tended to use 
instructional aanipulations. Bashinski and Bacharach 
(1980) point out that this distinction does not hold in 
all cases, and that in addition to successfully producing 
the attentional e£fect, it is necessary to use a 
dependent measure capable of registering the effect. 
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To avoid contamination of covert attention effects 
by eye movement effects, most of the experimental 
procedures which have been developed rely on the 
presentation of cue and stimuli within the 250 msec or so 
typically required to complete a saccade. Speeded signal 
detection or identification response is usually required, 
with reaction ti me or error rates constituting the 
dependent variables. Compared to the technique used by 
Kaufman and Richards (1969), the use of rapid spatial 
~ uing and speeded response differs in that (a) the 2 
degree range of deviation found in spontaneous gaze may 
well not apply when fast spatial cues are used to 
manip ulate covert attention actively, and (b) the 
measurement of covert attention effects does not focus on 
the position of a ''functional fovea," but on the relative 
speed and efficiency of processing of information from 
attended or unattended locations. Whereas Kaufman and 
Richards' results conform to the fovea analogy of a focal 
center which moves around the visual scene, in later 
studies this geometrical model is exchanged £or more 
abstract discussions of allocation and deallocation of 
attentional resources (Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980) and 
the costs and benefits to subsequent processing of cuing 
(Jonides, Note 2). Shulman, Remington, and McLean 
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(1979), however, have shown that covert attention shifts 
occur in analogue fashion, that is, passing through one 
point on the way to another. This revives the geometric 
model, in effect, with the functional. fovea resembling a 
graded region of sensitivity (or prior entry), in 
contrast with the physical fovea, which is a sharply 
defined area of great acuity. 
The procedure used by Jonides (Note 2) is typical, 
and will be described in some detail because his findings 
suggested the present study, and because his procedure 
most closely resembles that of this study. Subjects vere 
tachistoscopically presented (for 50 msec) an array of 
four letters, one of which was always an "L" or "B," and 
their task was to make a speeded button-press response to 
identify which letter was present. Immediately before 
the stimulus array appeared, a cue was presented either 
centrally or peripherally, for a duration of 50 to 200 
msec, which either vas uninformatively neutral or 
correctly indicated the target letter's position 70 
percent of the time. He reasoned that if t.Jie control of 
covert attention was mostly reflexive, then peripheral. 
cues should produce greater benefit (vhen valid) and cost 
{when invalid) than central cues, on the assumption that 
peripheral cues should more automatically draw attention 
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than central cues can direct it. This hypothesis was 
supported by his results, he claimed, although the effec t 
vas seen only in greater cos t s, and not benefits. He 
pro posed an explanation for this, according to which the 
benefits asymptote with a small increment of alloted 
attention, while costs continue to accrue with greater 
decrements of allocated attention. 
A second experiment (Jonides, Note 2) vas based on 
the assumption that cues which operate automatical l y 
should be difficult to ignore. Three types of cues were 
used: neutral and peripheral cues, as above, plus 
uninformative cues. The la t ter were peripheral markers 
which, instead of being accurate 70 percent of the time, 
were random {that is, valid only 25 percent of the time), 
and subjects were told so. The results shoved the costs 
for the uninformative c onditions -- when subjects were 
urged to ignore the cues -- to be as great as for invalid 
peripheral cues, indicating th a t peripheral cues vere 
indeed difficult to ignore. 
These finding s -- that cues which produce covert 
atte ntion shifts appear to be difficult to ignore, and 
that this effect i s more apparent in th e processing costs 
at noncued positions than i n the processing benefits at 
cued positions -- directly raises th e issues of 
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distraction and distractibility. 
Distraction and Distractibility 
In common usage the notions of distraction and 
selective attention are antagonistic: distraction is the 
failure to sustain selective attention. Jonides• (Note 
2) findings suggest another conception of distraction, 
however. Rather than being the filtering through of 
random stimulation into consciousness (or into conflict 
vith attended processing), distraction in this case loo k s 
more ordered and systematic. The allegedly automatic 
effect of spatial cues in producing covert attention 
shifts is far from random, being highly selective with 
respect to spati al location. In essence, then, we have 
two selective a ttention systems here: a relatively 
auto matic system (the "spatial attention system," Hoffman 
& Nelso n , Note 1) which i s effective in moving around 
covert attenti on on the basis of rapidly prese nt ed 
spati a l information, and a voluntary system 
(operationally identif ie d with subjects• ability to 
follow verbal instructions) which appears to be 
relatively ineffective in shifting covert attention. 
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This phenomenon of visual distraction thus appears to 
involve the coordination of two systems -- one 
"automatic." the other "voluntary" -- and not the failure 
of a single system. 
We might ask at this point whether there is 
corollary evidence from neural physiology and anatomy to 
support this picture of the spatial attention system, and 
whether any theoretical or experimental work has been 
done which might point to a more general context for this 
new conception of distraction. 
Breitmeyer and Ganz (1976) present a seminal review 
and synthesis combining studies of visual masking. 
saccadic suppression. and neurobiology. in which the 
distinction between transient and sustained channels in 
visual pathways is the organiz i ng schema. In brief. two 
different types of cells have been identified within the 
visual system on the basis of their speed of neural 
transmission and the type of visual information to which 
they respond. Sustained cells preferentially respond to 
slowly moving or static visual stimulation and transmit 
their signals relatively slowly. while transient cells 
are particularly sensitive to rapidly moving or suddenly 
appearing stimulation and transmit their signals rapidly. 
In addition. sustained cells are sensitive to high 
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spatial frequency input, while transient cells prefer low 
frequencies. 
Since both transient and sustained cells are 
connected to their own kind from the retina to cortex, 
they seem to constitute semi-independent visual systems. 
sustained channels specialize in fine discrimination, 
contour analysis, and figural infor mation, and transient 
channels specialize in information about location and 
change in location (i.e., moveme n t) with only crude 
response to form. Breitmeyer and Ganz (1976) associate 
transient channels, among other things, with the "early 
warning" s ig n al about the location of a visual event 
which arrives at cortex 50-100 msec £aster than sustained 
channel input, allowing attention (or the functional 
fovea) to be shifted accordingly . To rephrase, they 
believe that covert attention shifts are produced in 
response to transient channel activity. which conveys 
information only about location, movement. and sudden 
onset or offset of stimuli. The "decision" to shift 
covert attention. if this account is accurate. would not 
include information about what has appeared or moved in 
visual space , an d would s e em to be capable of no 
(non-spatial) selectivity in its respons e , only perhaps a 
general inhib i tion. In s ummary then, evidence exists 
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that the movement of covert attentio n is initiated by 
fast responding cells and in the absence of any 
information other than the location of some transient 
visual event. This is in substantial agreement with the 
view stated above, that the spatial attention system 
operates automatically and selectively with respect to 
location. 
The second guestion, about a more general context 
for the new conception of distraction, is addressed in 
the work of Shiffrin and Schneider (1977; Schneider & 
Shiff r in, 1977) on controlled and automatic information 
processing. They propose a two factor model of 
information processing which subsumes the areas of visual 
search and attention, long and shoct term memory stores, 
and auto matic processing. There are, they say, two 
differ e nt modes of human information processing, which 
correspond to the domains of short term and long term 
memory stores. Long term storage is conceived to be a 
very large number of nodes which permanently encode 
information. Those nodes which are activated at any 
particular moment constitute short term memory, and the 
portion of those which remain activated sufficiently long 
are included in conscious awareness (i.e., working 
11·emory). This last subset is the locus of "controlled 
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processing." Although severely limited in capacity, the 
controlled processing workspace is highly flexible, and 
temporary structures can be set up easily for operations 
such as serial comparisons. Through much consistent 
repetition of a task, nodes become associated with each 
other to the extent that one node, when activated, 
automatically and rapidly activates the next, so that a 
string of nodal activations may culminate in an overt 
response with little or no use o( limited short term 
storage, and even without the subjective awareness of the 
person. This is "automatic" processing, and it generally 
operates in parallel fashion, as when aany spatial 
locations are simultaneously monitored as efficiently as 
a few (e.g., Egeth, Jonides, & wall, 1972). A great deal 
of consistent practice is required, however, for such 
automaticity to be developed (or "learned"). 
This framework readily accommodates the account of 
distraction developed above: distraction is not the 
consequence of stimulation from the (external or 
internal) environment of a rand o m sort. Bather, the kind 
of stimulus which will commandeer attention is the kind 
which has, through long pcactice, laid down tracks in our 
long term store. Just as the spatial attention system is 
attuned to information about location and movement, and 
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responds to it apparently without voluntary effor t , 
habitually associated nodes too may respond automatically 
to stimulation which is not relevant to the selective 
attention task at hand. In both cases, distraction 
occurs. 
Although the same general model of automatic 
distraction seems to apply to both cases, there are major 
differences in the kinds of distraction effects each 
system is understood to produce. When a learned 
automatic process is initiated which includes as part of 
its activation sequence the emergence into conscious 
awareness, the limited capacity of controlled processing 
workspace i s "forced" to admit an intruding item, which 
may "bump" one or more of the elements in a temporary 
processing s t ructure, causing disruption of the 
controlled p r ocess. The dis t rac t ion c a used by covert 
atten t ion shifting, in comparison, seems not to compete 
with or disrupt control l ed processing, but only to delay 
the arrival and/or degrade the quality of visual 
information from points d istant from the cued spot. 
In what way, then, are the tw o similar? First, they 
both constitute systematic input to higher processes, and 
their e£fect may be negative (i.e., distracting) or 
positive, depending on the situation. To a hunter 
14 
scanning the horizon, for example, the rapid, automatic 
pull of covert attention toward moving objects would 
assist in the intentional task, while the same wou.ld not 
be the case for, say, a diamond cutter, who needs to 
maintain focused attention. Similarly, some learned 
automatic processes would be indispensible to a musician 
in sight-reading, but to a beginning ausician who has not 
yet automatized musical encoding, most automatic 
processes would be distracting. 
Another similarity follows from the first: since 
both apparently send input automatically to higher 
processes, for the higher processes to be freer of their 
influence, it wouid seem necessary either to decrease 
their activity or responsiveness, or to filter their 
input. This closely resembles Treisman•s (1960) 
attenuation model of attention, with the difference that 
we do not assume that a single attenuation f unction would 
regulate all potential automatic inputs, nor even that 
both of the automatic pro ce sses being discussed are 
capable of attenuation. 
This moves us from distraction into distracti.bility, 
and raises the issue of individual differences. It is an 
empirical question whether individuals vary in their 
susceptibility to distraction, and also whether this 
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might be due to differences in the act i vity of automatic 
processes, or in the strengt h of an attenuato r function 
in suppr e ssing them. One of the aim s of the present 
study is to be g in in a rough way to exp l ore these 
q uestions . 
Ps yc hophysical approaches share a bias toward a 
nomothetic attitude, that it is the regula ri ty of a 
phenome n o n that is interesting, an d that va r iability is 
"error variance." The rec e nt ' exceptions to this trend 
(e.g., Cooper, 1976; Cunningham, Cooper & Reaves, 1982) 
have concerned individual differences in visual 
comparison strate gi es, and have attempted only to 
distinguish two groups. 
Since Darwin and Galton (Watson, 1978), however, an 
ideographic tradition has found variability among 
individuals intrinsically interesting, part i cul ar ly in 
ar e as such as personality, intelligence, and development. 
Bateson (1972) notes that in the past h u dr ed years 
evolutionary the ory ha s come to see the het e rogeneous 
species as the unit of natural selectio n , rather than th e 
indi vidual organism. The va ri a b ility within a species 
thereby gains new importanc e : "In other words, 
potentia l i t y and read i ne ss for change is {sic) already 
built into the survival unit. The h e terogeneity of the 
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wild population is already one-half of that 
trial-and-error system vhich is necessary for dealing 
with environment." (Bateson, 1972, p. 451) 
Questions of variability in attention are not of 
casual interest onl1. "Attention deficit disorder•• is 
currently the approved diagnostic term for what had 
previously been called childhood hyperactivity (DSM-III, 
1980), and "impaired attention" has long been regarded as 
a major feature of schizophrenia (Silverman, 1964). The 
use of the term attention in such cases is often 
imprecise and global, and would perhaps benefit from a 
more specific and articulated theoretical framework for 
considering attention and distraction. At the same time, 
consideration of the implications of indi vidual 
differences for adaptation promises to enrich the 
normative psychophysical view. 
The Experiment 
The present experiment used a modification of 
Jonides• (Note 2) procedure. An array o f four letters 
was presented for 50 msec, and subjects were to identify 
with a speeded button-press whether the array contained 
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an "F" or 11L. 11 The nature of the preceding cues differed 
in several respects from those of Jonides. A single type 
of cue was used, a blink on the right or left. Two types 
of trials occurred: the target could appear on the same 
side as the cuing blink, or on the opposite side. At the 
start of each set of trials, subjects were told (a) that 
the target letter would be on the same side as the blink 
100 percent of the time, (b) that it would be on the 
opposite side 100 percent of the time, or (c) that the 
blink would be random, that is, 50 percent on the same 
side, 50 percent on the opposite. 
The central question of the study is, How do the 
automatic spatial attention system and voluntary 
processes interact? The design of the study is such that 
equivalent cue-stimulus combin a tions were presented in 
two situations, namely, when cue position was 
i nformative, and when it was not. Furthermore, when the 
cue was informative with respect to voluntary control 
that is, when it was possible to try to use the blink 
vo l untary effort could be either in the same direction as 
the spatial attention system's pull, or in the opposing 
direction. In uninformative cue trials, voluntary effort 
consisted in the possibility of "blocking out" the 
peripheral blinks. 
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Of th e many possible patter n s of results, several 
ar e of special int erest because they would be con s istent 
with pl a usib le accounts of the interrelation o f the 
voluntary and automatic processes and with previous 
findings. They are discussed in terms of AOC ana l ysis, 
described in a later section. 
The first, the Ineffective Volition Model, 
hypothesizes that voluntary ef f or t wi ll have no 
ben e ficial effect, whether it paral l els covert attention 
shifting or opposes it. There are two possible patterns. 
In Patte r n 1, the AOC lines for informative and 
uninformative cue conditions will not differ from each 
other: this is the null hypothesis for voluntary effort. 
In Pattern 1, the informative cue AOC lin e will be a 
"sh i fte d out" version of the uninformative cue line. 
This woul d mean that voluntar y effort uniformly slowed 
do wn res p onses, and would be understan dabl e wi t h 
referenc e to Sh iffrin and Schneider's (1977) description 
of co nt r olled (i.e., volunta r y) processin g , as a time 
consuming, seria l process. 
The second, the Non-in t erac t i ng Model, portrays the 
spatial attention system as indepe n dent of voluntary 
control: voluntary effort i s incapable of adjusting the 
gain of the spatial attenti on system, either to increase 
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or attenuate its effect. It predicts that the AOC line 
for informative cues will be a "shifted in" version of 
the uninformative cue line, indicating that voluntary 
effort yields faster reactions, but is transparent to the 
spatial attention system. 
The third, the Interacting Model, proposes that 
advance knowledge about the nature of cuing blinks c o uld 
allow the automatic pull of spatial attention to be 
increased and/or attenuated. A volitional augmentation 
of spatial attention shifting would appear in the data as 
informative cue points moving farther apart on the AOC 
line, while an attenuation would appear as uninformative 
cue points moving closer together on the AOC line. It 
should be noted that the present study is capable only of 
detecting an interaction and not of identifying whether 
it is augmentation, attenuation, or both. 
The other major thrust of the study is to explore 
the construct of covert attention distracti..bility, 
specifically with respect to whether the model which 
emerges appears, on the one hand, normative, and on the 
other hand, variable. The former is relevant to the 
first research question discussed above, i.e., the nature 
of the interaction of the automatic and voluntary 
processes. The latter is relevant to the guestion of how 
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much individuals vary, both in how cl osely the y fit the 
model, and in the magnitu d e of effects wi thin the model. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Sixteen female and six male undergraduate psychology 
students served as volunteer subjects, and received extra 
course credit £or their participation. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The range of ages 
was 17 to 42 years, with all but one being between 17 and 
20. Seven were left-handed and fifteen right-handed. 
surprisingly, seven reported mixed hand/eye dominance. 
None of the subjects reported previous experience in 
psychophysical studies. 
Apparatus 
St i muli were presented on a standard video monitor 
driven by an Apple II+ microcomputer, which also 
constructed and ordered the stimulus arra ys, timed 
response latencies, and tabulated the data. Subjects sat 
approximately 109 cm from the mon itor screen. On the 
desk-arm of the chair in which th e y sat were two 
pushbuttons, positioned to be operated with two fingers 
of the right ha nd. The two buttons were identified as 
"F" and "L" responses by a card attached to the desk top. 
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The computer program which timed the stimulus seguence 
and the subjects• responses incremented a counter at an 
interval of 965 usec, and consequently reported time 
values are approximately 3.5 percent too large. 
Stimuli 
All stimuli appeared white against a dark 
background. Stimulus letters and white blocks which 
served a s central fixation target and the peripheral 
cuing blinks vere all approximately 30 minutes of visual 
arc in size. The four letters were at the corners of an 
imaginary sguare surrounding the center, and were 
approximately 2.5 degrees from the fixation target. The 
cuing blinks appeared approximately 5.4 degrees to the 
right or left of the fixation target. The stimulus 
arrays were automatically constructed by the computer, 
vhich placed either an For Lin one corner of the 
display, then filled the other three positions with 
random letters (sampling without replacement). A total 
of sixteen different stimulus array patterns were used: 
the two target letters could appear in four different 
screen positions after a blink on either the left or 
right periphery. 
As a result of the raster-type CRT display and the 
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shor t presentatio n period, letters in the array may have 
appeared to subjects as slightly degraded images. Since 
th e raster must scan the screen twice (at approximately 
17 msec per pass) to refresh every screen point, a 
stimulus letter would be represented in full resolution 
from approximately 15 to 30 msec out of a 50 msec 
availability. Temporal summatio n was assumed to 
functionally neutralize this variability of image 
formation. Even if some letter images appeared more 
degraded than others, however, the effect was randomly 
di s tributed across trials, since the raster cycling and 
letter availability were temporally independent, and no 
systematic bias in the results shoul.d have occurred. 
Procedure 
Each subject participated in a single experimental 
session of about one hour. After receiving basic 
information about hand and eye preference, vision, etc., 
the experimenter described the task briefly to subjects 
and obtained informed con s ent. The task vas then 
described in more detail and demonstrated, and t he 
outlin e of the session was given: stimulus presentations 
were grouped into blocks of sixteen, with four blocks 
constituting a set. Best periods of about three to five 
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minutes separated the five sets; subjects could also 
rest between blocks, although none did so. Screening was 
then done in two steps. First, subjects were instructed 
to fixate on a central target and verbally identify on 
which side a peripheral blink occurred. This ens ured 
that visual field deficits did not render cuing blinks 
unperceivable. To ensure that visual field deficits or 
acuity problems did not interfere with the letter 
identification task, a high accuracy criterion was used 
during the training period. (This also served as the 
experimental control over accuracy as a source of 
reaction time variability.) subjects were told that it 
was more important to be accurate than to be fast. The 
percentage of accurate responses was given as feedback to 
subjects after sixteen-trial blocks, and if after four 
blocks the subject was not able to achieve consistently 
high accuracy, further exhortation and up to three extra 
blocks of practice were permitted. 
After screening and practice, the instructions were 
rehearsed again (with emphasis on the importance of 
fixating on the center target and of responding 
accurately), and the procedure for the session described: 
three kinds 0£ blocks of trials would occur, and would be 
announced beforehand by the experimenter. Within a 
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bl oc k , t he cuing blinks (a) could appear every trial on 
the same side as the target letter in the arra y that 
follo wed; (b) could appear every trial on the opposite 
side: or (c) could bear no consistent relationship to 
target letter position, that is, half of the tim~ it 
would a ppe a r on t he same side, and half on the opposite 
side. 
Figure 1 shows the sequence and pres e ntation times 
for a single experimental trial. The central fiAation 
target appeared on the screen, and a chirpin g sound from 
the computer signalled the beginning of the trial. About 
one second later a peripheral block appeared on the right 
or left for 100 msec, followed by t he offset of fi xa tion 
target and peripheral block and the onset of the array of 
four letters. The offset of the array after 50 msec and 
the onset of the fixation target marked the beginning of 
timing of the subject's reaction. Another chirp 
indicate d that the subject's button press had been 
registered by the computer. After about a second, 
another trial automatically ensued. 
Each set comprised two observations of each of 32 
cells (sixteen stimulus patterns, as a bove, at two cuing 
condition s) , grou ped i nto four blocks of sixteen trials 
(one block each with same-side and oppo si te-side cues, 
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and two blocks with uninformative cues). Each subject 
completed five sets, yielding ten observations per cell. 
The sequence of block types for each set and across the 
five sets was determined with a modified Latin sguare 
procedure to control for order effect. Twelve different 
such protocols were constructed, and no more than two 
subjects followed the same protocol. 
The Attention Operating Characteristic (AOC) 
Although the attention operating characteristic 
(AOC) and the eguivalent performance operating 
characteristic (POC) have been the subject of several 
theoretical discussions (Sperling & Melchner, 1978; 
Kinchla, 1980; Navon & Gopher, 1979), they have not yet 
been widely used, and are not universally known. This 
section will serve as a brief introduction for readers 
unfamiliar with the ap proach. 
The AOC was de veloped as one solution to the 
problems of understanding, interpreting, and modeli n g the 
attentional phenomena underlying empirical data. The 
performance of dual tasks is represented by plotting 
performance at Task A against performance at Task B. A 
curve (the AOC) is fitted to the plotted points 
corresponding to different attentional manipulations 
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s 
b 
1 sec 100 msec 50 msec RT 
Figure 1. Sequence and durations of stimuli in letter 
identification task. 
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(e.g., "Task A is twice as important as Task B11 : "The 
word •cupcake' is three times as 1ikely to be heard in 
your left ear as your right."), and that curve is assumed 
to describe the attentiona1 selectivity which operates 
between the two t asks. Kinchla (1980) sta t es that a 
single reservoir of attentional resources is expressly 
not an assumption of AOC analysis, but rather that many 
resources an d structures must underly observed trade-off 
functions. Navon an d Gopher (1979) go further and reject 
the use of the term "attention" as a general descriptor 
of selectivity. The term is retained here, ho wever, 
since in the ca se of covert attention it is well 
specified and commonly used. 
Kinchla ( 1980) points out that the "sources of 
information" which constitute the dual tasks can be 
variously designate d , dependi n g on the kind of analysis 
to be done. In the present st udy, the du al tasks are 
t a ken to be the simultaneous monitoring of right- and 
l e ft-side s c reen positio ns for the occurrence of a target 
letter. It is assumed that if the two t a sks are indeed 
competing with each other for limited (attentional) 
resources, then improve d right-side monitoring will be at 
the expense of left-side monitoring, and vice Yersa. The 
use of AOC analysis here is aimed at seeing whether 
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different AOC functions are produced by informative-cue 
and uninformative-cue conditions, and whether peripheral 
blinks produce the same movement along the AOC 
function(s) (i.e., produce the same shifts of covert 
attention ) in both conditions. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To examine the effects on the sample as a whole of 
the four facto r s (informative or uninformative~; 
blink on the same or opposite side as the target letter; 
position of th e target letter; and identity of the 
target letter), a four - way analysis of variance with 
repeated measures was performed on the 32 cell means 
(2x2x4x2) of the 22 subjects. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was tested and found not to be 
violated ,Fmax(31,21)=3.18, E>-05). The results of the 
analysis of variance a r e su mmarized in Table 1. Of the 
four main effec t s, both of the e f fects of interest were 
significant at a n alpha level of .01: uninformative cue 
conditions were faster than informative (F(1,21)=15. 0 , 
£<.001); and blinks on th e same side produced faster 
reactions than opposite side blinks (F(l,21)=25.1, 
E<-001). In addition, a significant effect of letter 
(F(l , 21)=51.3, E<.001) was found, whos e interpretation 
was superceded by a significant interaction of position 
and letter (F(3,63)=21.15, E<.001). 
Since the interactin g terms were not of major 
inte r est, formal follow-up procedures were not used, but 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Table for Four-way Analysis of Variance with 
Repeated Measures (n=22) of Letter Identification 
Reaction Times {in Milliseconds) 
SOURCE df MEAN SQUARE F 
CUE 1 183890.4 14. 96•• 
CUE x s 21 12289.9 
BLINK 1 142671.1 25.08** 
BLINK X S 21 5688.2 
CB 1 5946.1 1.13 
CB XS 21 5275.5 
POSITION 3 96180.8 2.63 
POSITION X S 63 3650 2. 1 
CP 3 3 56 1. 8 0.99 
CP X S 63 3611. 5 
BP 3 5429.2 0.68 
BP X s 63 7935.8 
CBP 3 6106.5 1.37 
CBP XS 63 4471.9 
LETTEB 1 669124.4 51.34** 
LETTER X s 21 13033. 4 
CL 1 93.0 0.01 
CL X S 21 7183.7 
BL 1 8.2 o.oo 
BL X S 21 4927.1 
CBL 1 3011 .. 2 0.58 
CBL XS 21 5158.9 
PL 3 188198.1 21.15** 
PL XS 63 8896.3 
CPL 3 10472.0 3.06 
CPL X S 63 3422.4 
BPL 3 8917.8 1.79 
BPL x s 63 4986.7 
CBPL 3 10661.2 2.89 
CBPL x S 63 3689.4 
* P<.01 
** P<.001 
'IABLE 2 
t'lean Beaction Times (in Milliseconds) for 22 Subjects 
INF ORl1ATIYE CUE DNINFORMATIVE CUE 
blink: LEFT RIGHT LEFT BlGH'I 
tqt:LEFT HIGHT LEFT RIGHT bEFT JiI§_ii1 LEF'I BIGH'I 
1 528 573 585 636 497 486 547 494 
2 657 719 774 689 643 646 139 596 
3 971 1064 929 981 913 944 876 864 
4 865 828 936 690 865 705 898 741 
5 661 638 659 608 598 597 543 6 13 
6 683 669 665 592 648 626 6 4 2 605 
7 620 665 644 630 602 598 576 586 
8 746 699 722 711 714 671 744 696 
9 714 719 755 681 701 665 675 651 
10 1024 1063 1085 1078 1049 1121 1155 1016 
11 918 851 905 898 948 1004 977 851 
12 785 761 811 795 767 798 678 707 
13 888 834 950 936 802 890 800 754 
14 672 706 730 701 645 691 672 658 
15 848 814 928 840 813 913 805 696 
16 665 678 650 682 616 693 668 624 
17 668 751 748 692 686 675 741 724 
18 742 720 695 721 771 732 848 674 
19 601 605 698 561 577 586 691 565 
20 494 572 521 579 1196 546 494 540 
21 593 686 582 664 575 619 568 614 
22 578 614 614 527 555 570 609 557 
MEAN 727 746 756 729 705 719 730 676 
RT 
+-> 
4-
Q.) 
,--
+-> 
Q.) 
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750 750 (b) 
blink on left right 
I blink on 
700 700 left 
blink on right 
650 ~-----.- 650 . 
Inform Uni nform Info rm Uni n form 
CUE CUE 
Figure 2. Conventional graphic representation of letter 
identification data. (a) Target on right side of display. 
(b) Target on left . 
800 
blink right 
750 
left 
E:700 informativ e cue 
O = uninformative cue ro +-> 
700 750 800 
RT, target right 
Figure 3. Attention Operating Characteristic (AOC) representa-
tion of letter identification data. Dotted lines represent the 
trade-off model described in the text. 
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informal follow-up shoved that the letter "L" produced 
faster reaction times, and that this effect was specific 
to the right-hand screen positions. 
Further analysis of the aggregate data utilized 
graphical representations as Attention Operating 
Characteristics (AOC), described in a previous section. 
Graphs were constructed using the subjects• cell means as 
listed in Table 2, that is, collapsed across letter and 
upper/lower target positions. Figure 2 shows in 
conventional graphical form that uninformative cue trials 
produced faster responses, and that a peripheral blink 
caused faster responses to target letters appearing on 
the same side of the display as the blink, whether or not 
the blink was an informative cue. Figure 3 presents the 
same information in AOC form, and leads to a slightly 
different readin g of the results: the position of the 
blink shifts performance in favor of same-side targets 
even when the blink is not informative as to target 
position, and the cue-informative conditions are more 
difficult for subjects. 
The difference is that in the AOC-inspired account, 
the pairs of points are assumed to lie along a line 
(i.e., the attention operating characteristic) which is 
characteristic of the simultaneous performance of the two 
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tasks; and attentional manipulations are assumed to 
"pull" performance in on e dire c tion or the other along 
the line. We have only two points for each operating 
characteristic here, and are thus restricted to very 
simple characterizations of the attentional trade-off 
function. Also, since the analysis of variance showed no 
significant interaction of cue with blink, the two lines 
in Figure 3 can be considered to be parallel. 
Since left-handed subjects were required to press 
the response buttons with their non-preferred hand, it 
was expected that this disadvantage might lead to slower 
reactions. To assure that the pattern of their 
performance vas not also affected, AOC graphs were 
prepared for both right- and left-handed groups . The 
unexpect e d finding that left-handed subjects performed 
somewhat faster and i n closer conformity to the aggregate 
model tha n the right-handed group is evidence that 
handednes s is not a confound in the data. 
The r e are two reasons for assuming that the "true" 
slope o f b oth lines is -1. First, it de f ines a simple 
and parsimonious trade-off relationship which can be 
interpreted easily. Second, there are two pieces of 
evidence that thi s model £its the data well. The 
observed slopes of the two lines (-.58 and -1.72) are 
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relatively close to -1, considering that the range of 
slopes is minus infinity to infinity. Also, when the 
best-fit lines with slopes of -1 are drawn for the two 
pairs of coordinates, the points lie guite close to the 
lines: informative and uninformative conditio n points 
lie 4.2 and 6.3 msec from their respective lines in AOC 
space. These values, called Distance Scores, are 
reported in Table 3, and their calculation demonstrated 
in Appendix A. 
Analy s is of individual subjects• performance was 
aimed at assessing how well individuals fit the AOC 
pattern seen in the sample as a whole, and at _ tentatively 
exploring whether the covert attention effect might 
plausibly be considered to reflect individual differences 
in visual distractibility. 
Of the four derived measures given in Table 3, the 
two Distance score teras have already been described. 
They correspo nd to th e amount of deviation of the 
observed points in the AOC graph from the best fitting 
line with slope of -1, and are therefore indicators of 
individuals' similarity to the pattern identified in the 
aggregate data. If the aggregate pattern is a valid 
model for the trade-off functions of individual subjects, 
then the distribution of Distance Scores should show most 
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0£ the sample with small error values, with increasingly 
large errors being decreasingly frequent. Figure 4 shows 
that the two Distance Score measures (for informative-
and uninformative-cue conditions) do in fact show this 
pattern, with about half the sample deviating less than 
15 msec. 
It appears, then, that the pattern seen in the 
aggregate sample is a reasonably good representation of 
individuals' performance. This pattern may be 
interpreted as follows: The attempt to capitalize on the 
informativeness of cues was (a) costly in time, 
consistent with relativeiy slow, nonautomatic controlled 
processing, and (b) shows no evidence of altering the 
effect of the spatial attention system. In other words, 
the pull of the spatial attention system was not able to 
be either "turned up" or "turned down. 11 This corresponds 
to the Ineffective Volition ~odel, Pattern 2, as 
elaborated in th e Introduction allove. 
The third derived measure shown in Table 3 is the 
distance between the two (parallel) best fit lines. This 
value represents the measured difference in difficulty 
between the informative- and uninformative-cue tasks, and 
its calculation is demonstrated in Appendix A. Nineteen 
of twenty-two subjects show a positive difference, 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Derived !easures (n=22) 
OVERALL STANDARD ACCUBACI DERIVED !EASOBES* 
!EAN 
1 531 
2 683 
3 943 
4 816 
5 615 
6 641 
7 615 
8 713 
9 695 
10 1074 
11 919 
12 763 
13 857 
14 685 
15 832 
16 660 
17 711 
18 738 
19 611 
20 530 
21 613 
22 578 
723 
DEV I AT ION (P ER CENT) 1 
93 
165 
209 
185 
116 
166 · 
139 
116 
169 
268 
236 
151 
186 
121 
255 
140 
149 
219 
121 
105 
130 
128 
95 
98 
98 
88 
83 
95 
86 
99 
87 
95 
91 
97 
91 
99 
91 
93 
84 
91 
99 
92 
99 
98 
94 
42.4 
30.7 
44.1 
23.6 
11. 3 
33.5 
3. 8 
4.2 
1. 0 
26.8 
12.0 
21. 2 
57.9 
18 .7 
37.4 
3.8 
7.4 
16.2 
18. 7 
12.0 
11. 6 
18.0 
4. 2 
*Derived ■easures: 
2 
20.5 
16. 2 
41.3 
24.4 
13.7 
9.5 
13.4 
19. 4 
14.1 
0.3 
43.8 
63.6 
48.7 
2.1 
79.5 
6. 0 
36.7 
6 .7 
32.8 
2. 8 
4.2 
14.5 
6.3 
3 
105 
76 
123 
38 
76 
31 
69 
18 
62 
-32 
-73 
71 
128 
50 
71 
26 
1 1 
-51 
16 
31 
52 
14 
45 
1 Di stance Score, inforaative cue - distance in AOC 
space between infor■ative cue points and the line with 
slope of -1 best fitting those points 
2 Dista nc e Score, uninforaative cue - as above, for 
uninfor■ative cue points 
4 
50 
108 
88 
48 
57 
21 
28 
39 
29 
149 
155 
127 
136 
42 
217 
86 
73 
96 
115 
6 
8 
55 
49 
3 Cuing effect - distance in AOC space between the two 
best fit lines (see 1 and 2) 
4 Covert atte n tion effect - distance in AOC space 
between uninformative cue points 
(Calculation of derived measures shown in Appendix A) 
Note: The values in the bottom row are taken from the 
aggregate AOC, and are not ■eans. See Appendix A. 
V) 
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V) 
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0-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60-74 75-89 
Figure 4. Distributions of Distance Score measures. (a) In-
formative cue conditions. (b) Uninformative cue conditions . 
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indicating greater difficulty for the informative-cue 
conditions. Although the performance of the three other 
subjects requires comment, the sub s ta nti al agreement 
withi n the sample constitutes additional support for the 
adequacy of the aggregate pattern a s a no rmative model. 
During the experiment, bet ween blocks of trials, 
some subjects remarked that the "informative" cues seemed 
not to be helpful, and that they had adopted the strategy 
of ignoring the cuing blinks for all trials. Although it 
was not possible to compare self-report with performance 
in a systematic way (because the remarks were 
spontaneously offered, not consistently solicited), of 
the six subjects who stated unambiguously that they 
ignored all blinks, only one (subject 22) produced AOC 
points which appeared vis u ally to iie along a single 
line. Still, even though the reported differences in 
stra te g y could ~ot be detected in subjects• actual 
performance, the assumption that all subjects used the 
same strategy in utilizing cue information must be 
considered weakened. The distance between AOC li nes for 
each subj ec t, then, might reflect individual differences 
in processing speed, or differences in processing 
strategies, or both. The th re e subjects who shoved 
greater d i fficulty for unin f ormative cue reactions, in 
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particular, are suspect of having used a different 
strategy. This is supported by the observation that only 
one subject showed a higher standard deviation of 
reaction times over all trials than these three (see 
Table 3). 
The third derived measure, then, would not appear to 
be a good choice for exploration of individual 
differences effects. The same argument would apply to 
the distance separating the informative-cue points in AOC 
space. This value vas not calculated, and does not 
appear in Table 3. The distance between 
uninformative-cue points, however, escapes these 
particular objections, and should constitute an estimate 
of the magnitude of the covert attention effect for a 
subject. Its calculation is demonstrated in Appendix A. 
As Table 3 shows, the range of estimated covert attention 
effects (derived measure 4) is rather large (6-217 msec), 
with the value for the aggregate sample (49 msec) 
indicating a positively skewed distribution. The large 
range suggests that real individual differences may 
exist. Several transformations vere applied to the data, 
and a sguare root transform was found to produce a 
distribution which appeared normai, and to place the 
aggregate value near the mid-range. Figure 5 shows the 
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d istribution of the square root transform of the data. 
Subjects• accuracy rates (see Table 3) were not as 
high or as uniform as those often reported for similar 
experiments in which accuracy is not included as a 
manipulated or outcome variable (e.g., Jonides, Note 2). 
A positive consequence of this variability in error rates 
is that relationships can be explored between subjects• 
accuracy and other aspects of their performance. On the 
negative side it is possible that, on one hand, the 
inclusion of reaction times from error trials would bias 
the data, while on the other hand, their exclusion might 
seriously reduce the observations in some cells. As a 
check on the biasing effect of error trials, the data of 
the two lowest-accuracy subjects (numbers 5 and 17) were 
investigated in detail. In both cases, no pattern could 
be found in the distribution of error trials, and AOC 
graphs (described above) representing only accurate 
response trials showed no meaningful differences in 
pattern from graphs representing all trials (i.e., both 
accurate and inaccurate). At least on a gross level, 
therefore, error trials were indistinguishable from 
equivalent trials in which the target letter was 
correctly identified, and on the strength of this 
evidence subsequent analysis used the total data set, 
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Distance (msec) (square root transform) 
Figure 5. Distribution of square root transform of Covert 
Attention Effect for 22 subjects .· 
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with error trials included. 
Finally, bivariate correlatio£s were computed to 
explore relationships within the data, specifically to 
probe the character of the covert attention eifect 
(derived measure number 4), and of accuracy rates. lt 
shoul d be emphasized that co r relations i n a sample as 
small as the present one are unstable, a nd only the 
rou ghest sorts of conclusio n s are justified. Even these 
must be considered very tentative. 
Accuracy correlates low with mean reaction time 
(r=.05), indicating that subjects with faster reactions 
were generally not more prone to errors in letter 
identification. This is not necessarily inconsistent 
with our stated assumption that errors we re the result of 
rushed responses, since subjects may differ in the degre e 
to which th e y can speed their responses without losing 
accuracy. This notion that accuracy rate reflects a 
decision criterion, rather t h a n some such c haracteristic 
as processing efficiency or ability to focus on the task, 
is further supported by the low correlations of accuracy 
with standard deviation of reaction times (r=-.04) and 
with covert attention effect (r=.10). 
standard deviation and covert attention effect, on 
the other hand, correlate highly (r=.71) vith each other. 
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If we assume that overall variance is typically inflated 
by error variance, and i f ve con s ider that the co vert 
attention effect is, loosely speaking, "error variance" 
in the sense that th e cuing blinks were irrelevant to t h e 
identification task in the irrelevant-cue condition, then 
tvo possi b ilities present themselves. First, th e 
correlation could reflect the greater varia b ility 
consequent to the covert attention eff e ct itself: in 
other words, s ubjects who show a larger covert attention 
effect would ipso facto also show larger variance. 
Second, the degree to which subjects are susceptible to 
covert attention shifting might be associated with a 
general susceptibility to distracting effect s . The 
distance scor e me asures s h ould, in principle, reflect the 
non-covert atten ti on extraneous effects, assuming that 
the trade-off mode l developed above is valid. These 
mi ght be ex pe cted to include other distraction effects: 
for example, a subject might be distracted by an 
automatic te ncency to move covert attention right ward, 
perhaps as a resu l t of reading habits. If there is a 
gener a l distractibility, then Distance Scores should 
correlate mor e strongly with c o vert attention effects 
than with standard deviation. And in fact, Distance 
sco r e correlates hi ghly with covert attention effect 
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(r=.70) and moderately with standard deviation (r=.37). 
The concept of a general distractibility, therefore, 
appears to be a plausible one. It must be re-emphasized, 
however, that the power of the foregoing correlational 
analysis is very low, and the analysis is furthermore 
suspect of bein g tainted by nonindependence of the 
measures from each other. 
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CONCLUSION 
The present study has two chief findings. First, 
for the stimuli, intervals and tasks used, rapid 
peripheral blinks appeared to exert an irresistable 
"pull" on subjects• covert attention. Second, the 
opportunity to make strategic use of t he blinks as cues 
resulted in reaction times which were uniformly longer, 
not shorter, than eguivalent trials with uninformative 
blinks. No interaction was found between the speeding 
effect of the blinks and the slowing effect of 
informative cuing: the pull of the spatial attention 
system appears to be temporally or functionally prior to 
the (presumed) voluntary processes of strategy and 
judgement. 
Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) paradigm provides a 
us e ful frame work for th ese findings. The shar p co n trast 
between the fast, automatic functioning of the spatial 
a ttention system and the slowing effect of voluntary, 
strategic processing closely resembles t heir account of 
automatic and contro l led human i nformation processing. A 
notable divergence, however, is between Shiffrin and 
Schneider's emphasis on (over-)learned nodal activation 
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sequences and Breitmeyer and Ganz• s (1976) evidence for 
"wired in" spatial informatio n processing. Future 
research might address the question of the developmental 
course of the spatial attention system. 
A secondary finding is that individual differences 
may exist in t he spatial attention system's functioning. 
An index of · covert attention effect strength was derived 
from the AOC representation of the data, and the range 
was seen to be quite large. Previous investigators have 
tended to report only aggregate results, in cost/benefit 
f?rs, and to use few subje c ts. Future investigations 
might profitably explore the character and significance 
of individual differences in covert attention. 
Finally , Shaw (1980) has raised an important issue 
which, in a ge neral way, is addre s sed by the finding s of 
the present study. She points out the difficulty an d 
importance of distinguishing th e effects of attentional 
shi f ts, which a f f e c t the quality of information 
proc es sing at one location at the expense of another, 
from the effects of strategic changes, in which 
information (r e gardless of i ts quality) is diff e rentially 
weighted by the subject as a result of "atte n tional" 
manipulations. Sh aw (1980) seem s not to believe in 
non-capacity limited automatic encoding, as discus s ed by 
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Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), and her own approac h to 
distinguishing attention from strategy reflects that 
attitude. Without arguing with Sha w's assumptions, we 
vish to point out that the present study seems to have 
driven a wedge between attention and strategy, with 
automatic attention shifts resulting in faster res ponses, 
a nd strategic effort resulting in slow e r responses. The 
same pattern might not obtain with different intervals, 
particularly longer ones. Moreover, other tasks may mask 
rapid attentional effects with slower co n trolled 
processes required in the response. It would seem that 
in order to settle the controversy, systematic 
investigation is needed to est a blish t he construct 
valid i ty o f n on-capacity limited automatic processes, a n d 
to specify the conditions under which t hey are and are 
not demonstrable. 
50 
APPENDIX A 
Calcuiation of Derived ~easures 
The derived me asures are based on the AOC graph for 
a subject of for the aggregate saaple (refer to Figure 
3). In e a ch case tvo pairs of points are plotted, 
represe n ting performance for informative and 
uninformative cue conditions: an d the derived measures 
describe patterns in the data, and t h e " goo dness of fit" 
of a trade-off function suggested by the aggregate data. 
Calculations wi ll be demonstrated using the data for 
Subject 1 (see Table 2). 
Before the derived me asures themselves c an be 
calculated, the lines represent i ng th e trade-off model 
must be fitted to the pairs of point s . The model 
specifies lines with a slope of -1. Any line in two 
dimensional space is completely des cr ibed by an equation 
of the form 
Y=AX+B 
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i n which A is the slo pe and Bis the Y i n tercept. Since 
the slope here is known , only the Y intercepts must be 
specified. One method of finding the best fit line with 
a slope of -1 is to find the Y intercepts of the l i ne s 
vith slopes of -1 which pass through each of the two 
points, and t a ke their mean. Rewriting the equation, 
B=Y-AX 
For informative cue points, therefore, the Y intercept of 
the best fit line may be found thus: 
B=573- (-1) (538) = 1101 
B 1 =636- (-1) (585) = 1221 
B(best fit)=(1101+1221)/2=1161 
Likewise for uninformative cue points: 
B=486- (-1) (4 97) =983 
B1 =494- (-1) (547)=1041 
B(best fi t)=(983+1041)/2=1012 
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Derived Measures 1 and 2: Distance Scores 
The first two derived measures describe the 
"goodness of fit" of the two fitted trade-off lines. 
They constitute the shortest distance of the plotted 
points from their respective lines. (This contrasts vith 
the least-squares approach usually used in bivariate 
analysis.) The three Y intercepts for each condition 
found above allow the simple calculation of the vertical 
distance between a line and either of its observed 
points: 
D(informative)=1221-1161 or 1161-1101 = 60 
D(uninformative)=1041-1012 or 1012-983 = 29 
The vertical distance dan be shown to represent the 
hypotenuse of an isoceles right triangle whose short side 
is the desired goodness of fit measure. It is calculated 
thus: 
Distance score (informative) = 60 //2 = 42.4 
Distance score (uninformative) = 29 /./2= 20.5 
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Derived Measure 3: Cuing Effect 
The third derived measure describes the magnitude of 
the effect that informative cui n g had on performance. I t 
assumes that the trade-off function of the best fit lines 
represents the true values underlying the observed 
points, and is described graphic a l l y as the distance 
separating the two (parallel) best fit lines. The 
calculation follows t ha t of Derived Measures 1 and 2 
above: 
D = 1161-1012 = 149 
Cuing effect= 149 /ff= 105.3 
Derived Measure 4: Covert Attention Effect 
The fourth derived measure describes the effect 
within the uninformative c ue condition of a peripheral 
blink occurring on the right or left. Graphically it is 
the distance between the Wiinformative cue points. It 
uses the simple formula for the distance of points in two 
dimensional space: 
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D = / ( 486-494)2. + {497-54 7) 1 = 50. 6 
Note: For convenience sake, all final results reported 
in the tables were rounded downward. 
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